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	<title>Comments on: Russia&#8217;s energy weapon</title>
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	<link>http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2008/02/17/russias-energy-weapon/</link>
	<description>Sustainable energy policy, more competition, better regulation, improved policies.</description>
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		<title>By: Roland Kamara</title>
		<link>http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2008/02/17/russias-energy-weapon/comment-page-1/#comment-14666</link>
		<dc:creator>Roland Kamara</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 08:55:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.energypolicyblog.com/?p=118#comment-14666</guid>
		<description>I don’t totally agree with A. Goldthau and I’d like to develop 2 main objections.

First, I’m sure that the state of Russia has a real power on every Russian energy companies. I know that figures seem to show the contrary (even if 25% is already an important figure), but we’ve to bear in mind that Russia is not an occidental democracy. Indeed, while Poutine was president, everything rose: revenues, GDP and so on, but also corruption. And that’s an essential point to understand how this country is working. That’s why I’m convinced that Russia totally controls each energy company on his territory. Moreover, since May, 2nd Dimitri Medvedev has become president of the Russian federation. And this new president is also -and especially- one of the key men of Gazprom, the biggest gas company in Russia (and also in the whole world) with 87% of the Russian global production. Therefore, I think that we’ve to interpreter figures cautiously and, to me, the state of Russia has a major power on Russian energy companies.

Furthermore, I think that we shouldn’t underestimate Russia’s energy weapon. Indeed, when reading A. Goldthau, everything seems clear, limpid. We should nevertheless take into account the fact that a contract in Russia in not exactly the same as in Europe. I’m not sure that a contract will prevent Russia from rising prices in the next few years. Corruption is so present that a single contract is not fully reliable. Plus, it is generally thought that the next big war will be a resources war (water, oil, gas…) and I really think that, in this case, Russia will have a major advantage that no contract can break.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don’t totally agree with A. Goldthau and I’d like to develop 2 main objections.</p>
<p>First, I’m sure that the state of Russia has a real power on every Russian energy companies. I know that figures seem to show the contrary (even if 25% is already an important figure), but we’ve to bear in mind that Russia is not an occidental democracy. Indeed, while Poutine was president, everything rose: revenues, GDP and so on, but also corruption. And that’s an essential point to understand how this country is working. That’s why I’m convinced that Russia totally controls each energy company on his territory. Moreover, since May, 2nd Dimitri Medvedev has become president of the Russian federation. And this new president is also -and especially- one of the key men of Gazprom, the biggest gas company in Russia (and also in the whole world) with 87% of the Russian global production. Therefore, I think that we’ve to interpreter figures cautiously and, to me, the state of Russia has a major power on Russian energy companies.</p>
<p>Furthermore, I think that we shouldn’t underestimate Russia’s energy weapon. Indeed, when reading A. Goldthau, everything seems clear, limpid. We should nevertheless take into account the fact that a contract in Russia in not exactly the same as in Europe. I’m not sure that a contract will prevent Russia from rising prices in the next few years. Corruption is so present that a single contract is not fully reliable. Plus, it is generally thought that the next big war will be a resources war (water, oil, gas…) and I really think that, in this case, Russia will have a major advantage that no contract can break.</p>
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		<title>By: Rémi Cousin</title>
		<link>http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2008/02/17/russias-energy-weapon/comment-page-1/#comment-13870</link>
		<dc:creator>Rémi Cousin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 12 Apr 2008 09:48:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.energypolicyblog.com/?p=118#comment-13870</guid>
		<description>I admit that considering the nature of the gas market, Russia may not have the ability to use gas as an energy weapon against Western European countries. However Moscow is using it in Eastern Europe by reinforcing the control over the gas transit infrastructure from the East to Europe. The purchase of the gas network (in Moldova, Belarus) and the projects of building new gas pipelines (Nordstream, South Stream) bypassing current transit countries is limiting their influence in the energy field by depriving them from the transit income and the control over the infrastructure. 
 
The decision of building these new gas pipelines is more strategic and political than just economical, as in both case cheaper routes exist. The construction of the North Stream gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea bypassing Belarus, the Baltic States and Poland would have a substantially higher cost than the construction of a second leg to the existing Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. The South Stream pipeline will carry gas to Southeast and South European countries across the Black Sea and via Bulgaria bypassing the Ukraine and Turkey. It would have been less expensive to carry gas via Turkey via a second leg of the Blue Stream pipeline (whose construction was mentioned by President Putin in 2006). 

By limiting the number of transit countries compared to the existing or cheaper routes, these new gas pipelines reduce their influence on the gas transit to Europe and thus strengthening Russia&#039;s power on its neighbouring countries.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I admit that considering the nature of the gas market, Russia may not have the ability to use gas as an energy weapon against Western European countries. However Moscow is using it in Eastern Europe by reinforcing the control over the gas transit infrastructure from the East to Europe. The purchase of the gas network (in Moldova, Belarus) and the projects of building new gas pipelines (Nordstream, South Stream) bypassing current transit countries is limiting their influence in the energy field by depriving them from the transit income and the control over the infrastructure. </p>
<p>The decision of building these new gas pipelines is more strategic and political than just economical, as in both case cheaper routes exist. The construction of the North Stream gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea bypassing Belarus, the Baltic States and Poland would have a substantially higher cost than the construction of a second leg to the existing Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. The South Stream pipeline will carry gas to Southeast and South European countries across the Black Sea and via Bulgaria bypassing the Ukraine and Turkey. It would have been less expensive to carry gas via Turkey via a second leg of the Blue Stream pipeline (whose construction was mentioned by President Putin in 2006). </p>
<p>By limiting the number of transit countries compared to the existing or cheaper routes, these new gas pipelines reduce their influence on the gas transit to Europe and thus strengthening Russia&#8217;s power on its neighbouring countries.</p>
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