Comments on: The future of Carbon Intensity in China’s Economy http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2010/02/22/the-future-of-carbon-intensity-in-chinas-economy/ Sustainable energy policy, more competition, better regulation, improved policies. Fri, 03 Feb 2012 13:54:12 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Diana Garibian http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2010/02/22/the-future-of-carbon-intensity-in-chinas-economy/comment-page-1/#comment-70144 Diana Garibian Mon, 10 May 2010 17:24:41 +0000 http://www.energypolicyblog.com/?p=994#comment-70144 This article raises the issue of the role that China – and, more generally speaking, developing countries – should endorse in the worldwide environmental and energy policies. It clearly points out the crucial part that China could have to play in this matter. Indeed, China has recently become the first CO2 emitter in the world, and its growth rate forecasts allow us to believe that this trend should be even clearer in the years to come, as most of China’s electricity and energy is produced in coal power plants. In addition, a new coal power plant is built every week in China. But in spite of the fact that China’s energy policy will have tremendous consequences in the future, we may wonder whether it is fair for Western developed countries to ask of emerging countries to reduce, or at least mitigate, their carbon emissions. In my opinion, there are three key-points that may legitimate such a demand. First of all, environment is a global issue, and as any public good, it needs to be protected by a public authority in order to preserve its benefits for the whole community. This public authority is not clearly defined yet in the case of environment, as there is no supranational entity entirely committed to its protection. However, protocols and consultative agencies exist and countries that adhere to them may consider they have some sort of legitimacy in warning others of the situations, and pushing them towards more environment-friendly policies. Another point is that, as energy use and economic growth are related, it would be absolutely illogic and even absurd not to take into account the major influence of China on environmental issues. Last but not least, the Chinese growth rate will naturally encourage China on a path of structural changes of its energy use (e.g., improving its electricity network). Therefore, it seems all the more important that China be an active member of any energy-related policy, as it will have the means and possibility to make a substantial change in the WEO forecasts. Another point that can be raised when reading this article is the ambiguity of the Chinese goals regarding climate-change. Indeed, during the Copenhagen summit, the Chinese delegation assured it would reduce its carbon intensity by 40 to 45% by 2020, and by 80% by 2050, from 2005 levels. But considering the Chinese growth rate figures, this means that these commitments will lead in no way to an emissions cut, it is even expected that CO2 emissions could be doubled by 2030. It is obviously impossible to ask of China to reduce its carbon emissions, it would be unrealistic considering its fast developing economy. This creates another difficulty which is to find the most efficient way to control whether countries respect their commitment in terms of CO2 emissions or not. Therefore, not only is there a problem of legitimacy in trying to push China on the path to environment-friendly policies, there is also a bone of contention when it comes to measuring and assessing the efforts made by this carbon-consuming giant. This article raises the issue of the role that China – and, more generally speaking, developing countries – should endorse in the worldwide environmental and energy policies. It clearly points out the crucial part that China could have to play in this matter. Indeed, China has recently become the first CO2 emitter in the world, and its growth rate forecasts allow us to believe that this trend should be even clearer in the years to come, as most of China’s electricity and energy is produced in coal power plants. In addition, a new coal power plant is built every week in China. But in spite of the fact that China’s energy policy will have tremendous consequences in the future, we may wonder whether it is fair for Western developed countries to ask of emerging countries to reduce, or at least mitigate, their carbon emissions. In my opinion, there are three key-points that may legitimate such a demand. First of all, environment is a global issue, and as any public good, it needs to be protected by a public authority in order to preserve its benefits for the whole community. This public authority is not clearly defined yet in the case of environment, as there is no supranational entity entirely committed to its protection. However, protocols and consultative agencies exist and countries that adhere to them may consider they have some sort of legitimacy in warning others of the situations, and pushing them towards more environment-friendly policies. Another point is that, as energy use and economic growth are related, it would be absolutely illogic and even absurd not to take into account the major influence of China on environmental issues. Last but not least, the Chinese growth rate will naturally encourage China on a path of structural changes of its energy use (e.g., improving its electricity network). Therefore, it seems all the more important that China be an active member of any energy-related policy, as it will have the means and possibility to make a substantial change in the WEO forecasts.
Another point that can be raised when reading this article is the ambiguity of the Chinese goals regarding climate-change. Indeed, during the Copenhagen summit, the Chinese delegation assured it would reduce its carbon intensity by 40 to 45% by 2020, and by 80% by 2050, from 2005 levels. But considering the Chinese growth rate figures, this means that these commitments will lead in no way to an emissions cut, it is even expected that CO2 emissions could be doubled by 2030. It is obviously impossible to ask of China to reduce its carbon emissions, it would be unrealistic considering its fast developing economy. This creates another difficulty which is to find the most efficient way to control whether countries respect their commitment in terms of CO2 emissions or not.
Therefore, not only is there a problem of legitimacy in trying to push China on the path to environment-friendly policies, there is also a bone of contention when it comes to measuring and assessing the efforts made by this carbon-consuming giant.

]]> By: Steven Stoft http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2010/02/22/the-future-of-carbon-intensity-in-chinas-economy/comment-page-1/#comment-62054 Steven Stoft Mon, 22 Feb 2010 18:34:11 +0000 http://www.energypolicyblog.com/?p=994#comment-62054 Interesting and helpful perspective. There may be a simple answer to why China made this commitment. (1) As you say, they didn't. The fine print says "the above-mentioned autonomous domestic mitigation actions are voluntary in nature." (2) They probably just turned to DOE's May 2009 IEO and looked up what DOE predicted they would do -- a 45% reduction -- and said, we will do that or maybe 5% less. (3) according to DOE they cut intensity 44% from 1990--2005, and during the last five years of that they were going crazy with CO2, so that made them feel confident. see calculations: http://www.global-energy.org/lib/2009/09-08 But mainly, theyk new that even "legally binding" caps are just silly. Canada announced in the middle of the Copenhagen summit that it thought its Kyoto commitment just didn't make sense any more so forget it. China figured it was better to play this silly game than to fight it. Internationally, committing to caps makes no sense -- everyone who studies negotiations and the game theory of public goods agrees (at least all I can find agree). There is an alternative, just published in the Economists' Voice. http://www.global-energy.org/lib/2010/10-01 Interesting and helpful perspective. There may be a simple answer to why China made this commitment. (1) As you say, they didn’t. The fine print says “the above-mentioned autonomous domestic mitigation actions are voluntary in nature.” (2) They probably just turned to DOE’s May 2009 IEO and looked up what DOE predicted they would do — a 45% reduction — and said, we will do that or maybe 5% less. (3) according to DOE they cut intensity 44% from 1990–2005, and during the last five years of that they were going crazy with CO2, so that made them feel confident.

see calculations: http://www.global-energy.org/lib/2009/09-08

But mainly, theyk new that even “legally binding” caps are just silly. Canada announced in the middle of the Copenhagen summit that it thought its Kyoto commitment just didn’t make sense any more so forget it. China figured it was better to play this silly game than to fight it.

Internationally, committing to caps makes no sense — everyone who studies negotiations and the game theory of public goods agrees (at least all I can find agree). There is an alternative, just published in the Economists’ Voice. http://www.global-energy.org/lib/2010/10-01

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