Three studies published in 2011 have attempted to assess the cost of a nuclear exit. In June, UFE (Union Française de l’Electricité), the French electricity producers association, and Global Chance, a think-tank of scientists specialized in sustainable energy, published two detailed reports (here and here), financially assessing several energy scenarios for 2030. It was followed in October by a study of the French think tank “Institut Montaigne”, which tried to put a figure on the left wing candidate’s proposal to reduce nuclear power generation in the electricity mix. This later study is based on the annual report published by RTE, the French transmission system operator. The assessment made in these studies mainly focuses on the cost of the investments needed to reach three different objectives by 2030: maintaining the current nuclear share in the electricity mix at about 70%, reducing this share to 50%, or putting an end to nuclear power generation. They are primarily based on a series of energy and economic assumptions that are identified and discussed below.

The reports mentioned above examine the differences between the cumulative investments needed to achieve each scenario. The UFE assesses the three scenarios: maintaining, reducing or exiting the nuclear power generation, while Global Chance only analyzes the continuation and phase-out ones, and Institut Montaigne focuses on the continuation and reduction options. The total investment costs from now to 2030 in the different reports vary from € 322 to 506 billion. To better understand this discrepancy, one need to look at the relative difference in each report between the investments required to maintain the 70% share of nuclear and the investments required to reduce this share. Indeed, both UFE and Institut Montaigne assess that eliminating or reducing the nuclear share would cost between €60 and €126 billion more than keeping the current electricity mix. On the contrary, Global Chance concludes that exiting nuclear would cost less in investments than maintaining it; the invoice would then be €64 billion lighter. What can explain these fundamental oppositions?

Different figures for similar scenarios

The first factor is the difference in the way each report designs the different scenarios. The expression “continuation of nuclear power” namely has opposed meanings in each report. UFE and Institut Montaigne base their continuation scenarios on the idea of extending the current nuclear fleet lifespan to sixty years and finishing the construction of the third generation nuclear reactor EPR at Flamanville. In contrast, Global Chance sees it as a replacement of the existing reactors by EPRs after about three decades. All in all, the nuclear generation share remains 70%, but the implications are much different in terms of investment because investing in new builds and investing in life-duration of existing reactors is a different financial matter. Hence, in this scenario, UFE estimates the investments needed in nuclear power only at €40 billion, while Global Chance report is based on €175 billion. These different approaches also hold for the phase-out case: In the UFE report, phasing out means closing the nuclear reactors after a forty-year lifespan, but this figure is 33 years in the Global Chance report.

The distribution of the electricity mix between other energy sources follows different trajectories as well (see figure 2). For the continuation scenario, Global Chance estimates the renewable energy share at only 86 TWh, against 130 and 157 TWh in the two other reports, and with no solar power. (It is worth mentioning that the solar power generation capacity in France is currently 1 GWe in 2011 ) The resort to fossil fuel to provide backup to renewable intermittent energies and the peak load also differs significantly, all the more as the share of nuclear power decreases. In the phase-out scenarios, the ratio between fossil and renewables passes from 0.25 to 1 in respectively the Global Chance and UFE reports.

Saving energy, a critical factor

Besides the distribution of the electricity mix, the assumptions about the evolution of energy consumption patterns in the different scenarios and reports has a large incidence on investment costs (See figure 3).

UFE builds its scenarios on the so-called Grenelle environmental objectives, a stakeholders’ consensus achieved in 2009. It takes into account the possible variation of the GDP growth, and sorts out the energy saving initiatives into different categories based on their merit order, that is the relative cost of the saved kWh in comparison with the kWh actualized price. A profitability index on each measure is put to determine which measures are indeed worthwhile to implement. Consequently, UFE concludes on an average saving through energy demand management of 40 TWh per year in 2030, an exogenous figure which is only based on GDP growth hypotheses and is not related to the different scenarios and their impacts on electricity prices. The same is also true for transfers (e.g., electricity use induced by the development of electric vehicles) and market growth, which gives an average 570 TWh consumption in 2030 for the three UFE scenarios.

On the contrary, the two other reports consider energy demand management as a major factor to curb electricity consumption. On the one hand, Institut Montaigne, which does not provide exact figures, argues that a €45 billion investment measure, associated with higher electricity prices, could spare up to 25 TWh per year. On the other hand, Global Chance makes the assumption that major energy savings through energy demand management is possible only in the nuclear phasing-out scenario, with a cumulated €100 billion investment to save 220 TWh per year in 2030. This explains why nuclear phase-out is more profitable in the Global Case report, as the investments to spare 220 TWh (€100 billion) are far less expensive than the one needed to produce these TWh in the continuation scenario (€175 billion). The fact that Global Chance considers energy saving and nuclear power to be antagonist may appear puzzling. The report argues that the centralized panning which has characterized the French nuclear industry will conflict with the decentralization needed to implement energy saving measures such as smart grids.

The electricity grid, another source of differentiation

To a lesser extent, the investment costs assessments also differ from each other due to their differences in the costs necessary to adapt the electricity transmission network to the new context of energy demand management and renewable energies. In this respect, Global Chance investments in the case of a nuclear continuation, assessed at €128 billion over the next twenty years, will increase by 10% to €141 billion in the nuclear phase-out scenario. For UFE, the difference reaches 20 billion, from €135 to €155 billion, mainly because of additional developments in interconnections and import/export with the rest of Europe. The most expensive difference is found in the Institut Montaigne study, as it amounts to €21.6 billion for a mere 50% nuclear share. One could notice that this study also considers the highest investment/energy savings rate.

In terms of investment costs, exiting or maintaining nuclear power generation in France depends on a small number of key parameters. A more global assessment including impacts on employment, on trade balance and on other macroeconomic variables is much more complex and still needs to be done. We are not sure, however, that its findings would significantly change the political stances taken today by the French political candidates running for the Palais de l’Elysée.

Michel Berthélémy, Sébastien Douguet and François Lévêque, Mines-ParisTech

Turning first to the OECD countries with existing nuclear power programs, several countries where there was the possibility that they would build nuclear power plants to replace those that are retiring have now reversed course. These include Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Belgium (probably). The situation in Japan necessarily remains in flux, but as the country with the third largest nuclear program a decision to move away from nuclear power, together with Germany’s decision would have a material effect on future trends. However, in the rest of the OECD countries with existing nuclear power programs we believe that construction of new nuclear capacity would have been slow absent Fukushima. Any tightening of safety requirements resulting from the Fukushima accident will only make the economic status of nuclear power less attractive.

A potential exception is the UK, where a large fraction of the existing fleet of nuclear plants is likely to retire for economic and technical reasons. Thus, there is a replacement market in the UK that does not yet exist in the U.S., France, etc. In 2008, the UK government decided to support building new nuclear plants, and that decision has, so far, not changed as a result of Fukushima, though the UK is participating in the larger EU review and this will delay pursuing new construction pending the outcome of “lessons learned” from Fukushima. Three consortia have been pursuing construction of several new nuclear units (EDF-Centrica, RWE-E.On, GDF-Iberdrola) using modern light water reactor technologies. However, the prospective new builds in the UK face challenges. The UK has a very large and heavily subsidized renewable energy program, and while natural gas prices are still high compared to the U.S., additional supplies of LNG, and pipeline supplies from Norway, Russia and Central Asia are coming on line, and shale gas deposits have been identified in England and other parts of Europe. In addition, England and Wales has the most liberalized wholesale spot electricity market in the world, with no capacity payments or long term contracts. This market does not appear to be conducive to investments in nuclear generation. In order to attract nuclear power investment the government is pursuing floor prices for carbon allowances and additional electricity market reforms are planned, including long term contracts and a capacity payment mechanism. Nevertheless, in September 2011, Scottish and Southern reported that it was withdrawing from the GDF/Iberdrola consortium and would pursue renewable energy opportunities instead, though the other members of the consortium indicated that they would continue.It has also been reported that RWE is re-evaluating investing in new nuclear plants in the UK. At least in the case of RWE this decision is indirectly related to Fukushima, as the German government’s decision to close its older nuclear plants immediately has had significant adverse effects on the finances of German utilities. It does appear that the UK government is going to great lengths to support nuclear power as part of its GHG mitigation strategy.

Of course, the economic situation confronting investment in nuclear power could change. Experience with the few new plants that are still expected to be built in the U.S. and Europe may demonstrate that current construction cost estimates are too high (so far France and Finland’s experience has been just the opposite) and that optimistic break-in periods allowing these plants to achieve high capacity factors quickly are realistic despite the more pessimistic history—see Du and Parsons (2010). Natural gas prices could increase again. Countries could back off of lavish subsidies and goals for renewable energy and energy efficiency programs. This experience will probably take a decade to accumulate. Thus, we do not expect a dramatic increase in investment in new nuclear plants in the OECD countries with existing programs in this decade, even absent Fukushima.

In the non-OECD countries the major action is in China, first and foremost, as well as in Russia and the former FSU countries in Eastern Europe, and the rest of Asia. The post-Fukushima assessments have had little direct effect so far on plans to construct new nuclear units in the countries where significant nuclear programs were being planned prior to Fukushima. China did reduce its plan for new plants by 2020 by 10 GWe, but many considered the original 100 GWe goal for 2020 unrealistic and the reduction may have reflected considerations other than safety. Russia, India, South Korea and most other non-OECD countries are continuing as planned, pending additional information from reactor safety audits and more information from Fukushima. After reviewing the post-Fukushima situation some countries have now decided that they will not enter or reenter the nuclear expansion business (e.g. Taiwan, Chile, Israel, Venezuela), but the impact on the aggregate global nuclear supply would have been small anyway. On the other hand, non-nuclear Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Abu Dhabi have recommitted to start building nuclear power plants.

We do believe that the countries that are entering the nuclear power business and those that are considering dramatic increases in nuclear capacity may be underestimating the challenges associated with these plans. China currently has 15 operating reactors with a capacity of 11 GWe. It has 27 units under construction and plans to increase it nuclear capacity by a factor of seven or eight by 2020. It is relying on two foreign and two Chinese companies to lead this expansion. If there is one thing that we learned from the large expansion of nuclear capacity in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s it is that many unexpected construction and operating problems can emerge if the program is rushed, operates subject to constraints on the supply of skilled workers (like high-skilled welders, engineers, and construction managers) and does not build in time to respond to unexpected problems and to learn from experience. Successful nuclear power programs must meet economic, stringent safety and reliability criteria. We think that there is a serious risk that China’s program is too ambitious to achieve these criteria. Given the expected rapid growth in electricity demand, the small share of production contributed by nuclear power today (2%) and under the plan (6%), its dependence on imports of fossil fuels, and its goal of reducing dependence on dirty domestic coal supplies, China may be willing to sacrifice on the economics in order to meet energy security and environmental goals. However, China cannot fail to meet high safety standards and this may prove to be a constraint on how quickly its nuclear program can actually proceed.

Countries like Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Abu Dhabi face additional challenges. They do not have the regulatory infrastructure, internal technical expertise, waste handling, non-proliferation, or industrial structures necessary to rapidly launch a nuclear power program. Indeed, one of the reasons they are interested in starting such a program is to gain and internalize technical expertise and some industrial infrastructure to help to advance their economies. Abu Dhabi has taken an approach that “outsources” most of what is needed to start a nuclear power program in all of these dimensions. It would be would be wise for other countries in this group to learn from its experience.

Paul L. Joskow and John E. Parsons, MIT-CEEPR

P.S. This post is an excerpt from The future of Nuclear Power After Fukushima

Based on Japanese census data, we estimate that before evacuation there were 69,000 people within 20 km (12.4 miles), 160,000 within 30 km (18.6 miles), and 2 million within 80 km (50 miles) of the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor station.

Worldwide there are 135 reactor sites that have a greater number of people residing within 30 km of the reactor station than were residing within 30 km of Fukushima Dai-ichi; including 21 reactor stations with more than one million people within 30 km.Topping the list is the 125 MWe Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) in Pakistan, which has 8.3 million people within 30 km of the reactor. Two reactor stations on Taiwan—Kuosheng (2 operational reactors) and Chin Shan (2 operational reactors) have 5.5 million and 4.7 million people, respectively, living within 30 km; two adjacent stations in South Korea—Kori and Shin-Kori (5 operational reactors, 3 under construction and 2 planned) and two on the Chinese mainland— Guangdong/Daya Bay (2 operational reactors) and Ling’ao (4 operational reactors) have more than 3 million people within 30 km. A severe nuclear accident at any one of these stations could have devastating consequences for the entire country. Figure 1 displays a histogram of populations within 30 km of a reactor, worldwide.

Which reactors are located in areas that are in areas of high risk to earthquakes and tsunamis?

In a database maintained at NRDC, we have recorded the coordinates for 442 operational reactors in 31 countries, the majority of which are in North America and Western Europe. The geographic distribution of reactors worldwide may be analyzed with respect to two natural hazards that contributed to the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant: seismic and tsunami risks.

Seismic hazard data was obtained from the Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program (GSHAP), a demonstration program launched in 1992 by the International Lithosphere Program with the support of the International Council of Scientific Unions, and endorsed as a demonstration program in the framework of the United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. The GSHAP data consists of gridded seismicity hazard values in 0.1 decimal degree intervals in latitude and longitude. These seismicity hazard values are given in units of Peak Acceleration (m/s2) with 10% Probability of Exceedance in 50 Years. In these units, 0.0 to 0.8 are classified as a “Low Hazard;” 0.8 to 2.4 as a “Moderate Hazard;” 2.4 to 4.0 as a “High Hazard;” and greater than 4.0 as a 20 “Very High Hazard.” Figure 2 charts the number of operational reactors located in the given seismic hazard zones.

The 12 operational nuclear reactors within very high seismic hazard areas are listed in Table 3, and are located in Japan and Taiwan, including all of Taiwan’s six operating reactors.

In May of 2011 Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan requested that the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant be shut down, due to predictions that an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 or higher has an 87% likelihood of occurring in the area of the plant within the next 30 years. The plant remains shut and the reactors may begin decommissioning, pending the outcome of lawsuits. The three nuclear reactors at the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant remain in cold shutdown following the March 11th earthquake and tsunami.

In addition to the six operating nuclear reactors in Taiwan located in a very high seismic hazard area, two additional reactors are under construction at Lungmen: Lungmen Unit 1 is expected to begin commercial operation at the end of 2011.

Of the 36 operating nuclear reactors in the high seismic risk category, 29 are in Japan, 4 in the United States and one each in Armenia, Iran (Bushehr) and Slovenia (Krško). The 67 operating nuclear reactors in the medium seismic risk area include 15 in Japan, 10 in 21 France, 5 in South Korea, and 5 in the United States.

The degree to which an earthquake will damage a nuclear reactor depends not only on the magnitude of the earthquake, but also on the reactor’s seismic design basis. We note that the reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi appear to have withstood the March 11th earthquake, but the damage from the earthquake to the electric grid contributed to causing the station blackout conditions.

A world database of tsunami events is maintained by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC). The majority of tsunami events for wave heights greater than 10 meters have occurred in: Indonesia, the United States, Japan, Tonga (an archipelago in the South Pacific Ocean) and in the Russian Far East regions.

With respect to earthquake and tsunami hazards, and large nearby populations, Taiwan’s six reactors represent outliers in terms of high risks and consequences from a nuclear reactor accident.

Thomas B. Cochran, Ph.D. Consultant Senior Scientists, Nuclear Program and Matthew G. McKinzie, Ph.D. Senior Scientist Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

P.S. This post is an excerpt from a longer paper “Global Implications of the Fukushima Disaster for Nuclear Power”

That chapter served two primary purposes: first it observed that the enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 27 member states had shifted the balance of public policy opinion in favour of nuclear energy. Second it sought to provide insight into two particular countries from the enlargement process: Romania and Lithuania. These countries were chosen because of their very different relationships to Russia during the Cold War.

The paper opens with a brief consideration of the state of EU Member State opinion in 2006 relating to the then EU-15. My author’s assessment was as follows:

Strongly Positive: Finland, France
Weakly Positive: UK, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal
Neutral: Luxembourg, Denmark
Weakly Negative:Italy, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Greece
Strongly Negative: Ireland, Austria

Discussion of the issues underlying my selections is very brief in the book chapter. Hence I would like to take this opportunity to comment on, clarify and correct my assessment of 2006 official attitudes.

My assessments evolved from an opening assessment as presented at the opening CESSA conference held in Berlin, Germany in June 2007. In this posting I shall refer to the later listing published in the book and as reproduced above. Also at this point I must acknowledge a major source of information used to inform much of the text that follows. My thoughts have benefitted greatly from the ideas and data published by the World Nuclear Association (WNA) in its country reports. I commend those assessments to anyone interested in up to date information on national nuclear policies and activities. As this is a ‘blog’ rather than a scholarly article I shall not interrupt my prose with formal citations. If you are curious as to the source of any un-cited information, I suggest it is probably the WNA. Of course what is written here is not necessarily the opinion of any other individual or organisation and I take sole responsibility for what I present here.

The most extreme positions are relatively uncontroversial. My sense remains that Austria and Ireland remain the most officially anti-nuclear states in the EU-15 and this was their status in 2006. Ireland long ago abandoned plans for a nuclear power plant at Cansore Point in the Southeast of the country. Most especially the Electricity Regulation Act 1999 explicitly forbids the relevant government minister from granting statutory permission for a nuclear fission-based power station. Austria has developed a reputation for using its veto power under the Euratom Treaty to block expansion of EU nuclear fission policy to facilitate nuclear new build.

The countries at the other extreme are also similarly straightforward. I selected Finland for the strongly positive list owing to its leading position in the European Nuclear Renaissance for its new build project at Olkiluoto (OL3) and also noting much good progress on policy for nuclear waste management. France is included in the strongly positive list because of its status as the larger user of nuclear electricity generation in the EU-15 with more than 55 power reactors operating. In 2006 such a position was backed by a broad political consensus, not withstanding the fact that, according to Eurobarometer polling the French public are not especially pro-nuclear (see e.g. Europeans and Nuclear Safety poll, published Feb 2007 and based on October-Nov 2006 fieldwork).

The more difficult assessments lie in the intermediate zone between weakly positive and weakly negative. Such assessments are more likely to be open to debate and are more likely to have suffered from my own subjective biases.

In the weakly positive column I placed the United Kingdom. As an assessment of 2006 official opinion this was most strongly affected by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair saying that nuclear power is back on the agenda with a vengeance. I have always been struck by that most remarkably robust turn of phrase. I place the UK in the weakly positive camp notwithstanding that the Labour Governments had dismantled British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) on the back of earlier policies which had seen a complete refocusing or winding-up of world-leading nuclear research laboratories such as those at Harwell and Winfrith. The Conservative Party were, in the summer of 2006, was also supportive of new nuclear investment, but their position was more nuanced. Nuclear power was on their list but only as ‘a last resort’. In the months and years that followed Tony Blair’s 2006 speech the UK has continued to show strengthening interest in nuclear new build.

Some might take issue with my positioning of the Netherlands in the weakly positive group. Factors that shaped my thinking when making my determination include that the Netherlands operated (2006) one small power reactor at Borssele providing approximately 4% of Dutch electricity. The Netherlands also imports nuclear electricity from, for instance, Germany. The Netherlands has a strong nuclear energy research base including national and European facilities in Petten. The Netherlands used to operate one other nuclear power plant (at Dodewaard) but this was shutdown in 1997. It is important to note that in 1994 the Dutch Parliament voted to phase out nuclear power by 2003, but my perceptions were more shaped by the abandonment of that plan in 2005. Furthermore in 2006 a life-extension contract was agreed for the Borssele plant between operators and shareholders. In the couple of years after 2006 prominent public voices, including those of official advisors, started to advocate nuclear new build particular for the Borssele site.

The bottom two entries in my weakly positive list are especially open to debate. In 2006 Spain was widely perceived to be somewhat anti-nuclear, but my assessment was more positive, as it was affected more by actions than by rhetoric. I was most affected by the following observations. First, I acknowledged the highly visible 1983 nuclear phase out decision strongly associated with the Spanish Socialist Party. The 2004 election saw the arrival of Spanish Socialist Workers Party leader, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero as Prime Minister. As such, things could be said to have been bleak for nuclear power in Spain. The situation is reported by pro-nuclear European trade group Foratom to have been that the Socialist Party “has made a strong political statement to progressively phase out nuclear power, but so far no calendar or specific strategy has been fixed.” Putting the political rhetoric to one side, I was very struck by a quiet programme of power plant uprates achieved in the years of interest. The World Nuclear Association advises that in 1988 the Cofrentes plant was uprated 2%, then a further 2.2% in 1998, and a further 5.6% in 2002 and then 1.9% in 2003. A greater than 5% uprate was planned for Almarez at a cost of roughly $50 million. This officially sanctioned quiet progress in generation, together with progress on waste management (for Spain’s once-through fuel cycle) prompted me to allocate weakly positive status, despite the obvious political and governmental rhetoric, which I judged for 2006 to be a mere shadow of the Socialist’s political opposition to nuclear energy in the 1980s.

Portugal appeared at the bottom of my list as it was particularly difficult to assess. While Spain derived approximately 20% of its electricity from nuclear power, Portugal has no nuclear energy programme. It is clear from the Eurobarometer survey mentioned earlier that the Portuguese public are among the most sceptical about nuclear power with only 37% reporting that they believe nuclear power can be operated in a safe manner. In addition they are noteworthy as they self-report that they are among the least well informed about nuclear power. Oscar Gonzalez has considered the prospect of nuclear power in Portugal and he notes that the country has considered the possibility on three occasions 1954, 1974/75 and 2004. The 2004 period included ideas centred on the notion of possible collaboration with Spain. Around 2004 and 2005 many political and public policy voices pointed to the possibility of new nuclear build for Portugal, but Gonzalez observes that the government appeared to regard the topic as ‘taboo’ and the main opposition party had no public position on the issue. In the absence of a power programme, my sense of the Portuguese situation was affected by policy for Research Reactors. The Portuguese Research Reactor (RPI) has operated steadily since 1961 and in the 2006 period was part-way through a partly US funded conversion to Low Enriched Uranium fuel. The facility attracts roughly 2,000 visitors per year mostly students. In summary, the Portuguese position was difficult to assess and I categorised it as weakly positive with some caution.

I reported Luxembourg as holding a neutral position. Perhaps it would have been fairer to say that my sense was that Luxembourg had no position on the nuclear energy issue. According to the 2003 Luxembourg National Report under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the country has no nuclear power programme, it has no fuel cycle facilities, it has no research reactor and it has no energy-related radioactive waste. To my impression it has no substantial connection to nuclear issues and no obvious intention to change that situation, hence my allocation of neutrality.

Denmark, I characterised as neutral and here on reflection I now understand I have probably been in error. As former user of nuclear research facilities I may have been swayed by Denmark’s remarkable past achievements in the deployment and use of three research reactors at the world famous Risø Laboratory. By 2006, however that proud past was already just part of history, with the last research reactor having closed in 2001. Risø left the world of nuclear research joining with other non-nuclear laboratories in 2007. I may also have been affected by public attitudes reports for the Danish public which show high levels of understanding of nuclear power’s low greenhouse gas emissions and energy security benefits as reported in the Eurobarometer research mentioned earlier. My assessment, however, should not have been swayed by such metrics. My key omission was to neglect the role that Denmark had played in the shutdown of two Swedish reactors at Barsebäck in 1999 and May 2005. The Barsebäck plant was located only 20km from Denmark’s capital city Copenhagen. The May 2005 events were very close to my main period of concern and clearly revealed an officially anti-nuclear position. My positioning of Denmark in the table should have reflected that reality.

In grouping weakly anti-nuclear countries I put Italy at the top of the list. The most notable fact about Italy and nuclear energy in the middle of the last decade was that of all the EU-15 countries which announced an intention to phase out nuclear power following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, Italy was the only country actually to exit the game. In total three power plants were closed following a November 1987 referendum on the topic. A fourth plant under construction at Montalto di Castro was cancelled when almost complete. Mitigating against positioning Italy as more strongly anti-nuclear in 2006 was the possibility of nuclear power joint ventures under the 2004 Energy Law.

In the years after 2006, official Italian interest in new nuclear build increased significantly. In May 2008 the government would go on to give an explicit push for the idea. This push was to culminate in the 2011 referendum, but more about that later.

The next country assessed as ‘weakly negative’ was Germany. Germany is, I suggest, the most complex EU Member State as regards national attitudes to nuclear power. Germany is home to the liveliest nuclear power politics. The issue of nuclear power can take a central role in the political process in a way not seen in other EU countries. Roughly ¼ of German electricity in 2006 came from nuclear power. In 1998 a Federal coalition government of the Social Democrats and the Greens announced the phase out of nuclear power. A total power production limit of 2623 billion KWh was imposed across all 19 reactors then operating. This was equivalent to an average plant lifetime of only 32 years and less than the 35 years proposed by the electricity industry. Typically the plants would have a 40 year design life with the technical possibility of extension to 60 years. At the time the Christian Democratic opposition said that it would seek to overturn the decision. In the autumn of 2005 a “Grand Coalition” government took power under the leadership of the conservative Angela Merkel. For a while it seemed that nuclear power might recede from the political foreground. On 8 July 2007 the UK Daily Telegraph reported under the headline: “Germany to stay nuclear in Merkel U-turn”. It is also noteworthy that Eurobarometer 2007 reveals that the German public were not as anti-nuclear as might intuitively be expected. Despite small glimmers of a moderation of attitude, in 2006 the German position could not be described as anything other than anti-nuclear.

Next in my weakly anti-nuclear list was Sweden. While perhaps my assessment was overly negative, I should outline that factors which shaped my views. Roughly 40% of Sweden’s electricity comes from nuclear power. In 1980 following the Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania the government had decided to phase-out nuclear power. In 1997 a new energy policy permitted some life extensions, but forced the closure of the twin unit Barsebäck plant (see earlier discussion of Denmark’s position). Despite the closure of Barsebäck Swedish nuclear generation has grown as a result of strengthening output from the remaining plants. A dominant factor in my assessment, however, was the special “capacity tax” levied on Swedish nuclear power plants. In January 2006 the tax was doubled. That measure, more than anything else prompted me to classify Sweden as officially anti-nuclear despite the country’s good record in nuclear power plant management and impressive progress on radioactive waste policy.

As we approach the countries towards the bottom of the weakly anti-nuclear list my confidence reduces. Belgium is a case in point. In the middle of the last decade Belgium sourced more than 50% of its power from seven nuclear power reactors. In January 2003 a new Federal Act prohibited the building of new nuclear power plants and limited the life of existing plants to 40 years in the absence of a compelling security of supply crisis. This Act represented official opinion at the time of my assessment.

I note that a study to the Belgian government commissioned by the government, the Commission on Energy 2030, in 2007 recommended the long-term use of nuclear power, but it was never an official position of the state. In 2006 while public attitudes were moderately favourable and while there was some growing discussion of life extension the position could not have been described as anything other than negative. In the months and years that followed I note that position would start to soften until the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

The final country considered was Greece. Its position might be described as a combination of the neutrality borne of irrelevance seen in Luxembourg and a political consensus of aversion to nuclear power. Like Portugal Greece has a research reactor (GRR-1 pool type reactor) and in the years after 2006 it was upgraded with Korean assistance. In 2006, however, there was little or no visible consideration of nuclear issues and it was most definitely off the national agenda.

With those thoughts in mind I assembled the table published in the CESSA book. However, so much has happened since then.

In the book chapter I also assessed attitudes in similar terms for the newest EU member states. My main observation was that the balance of such attitudes was significantly more pro-nuclear than was seen for the EU-15. Since making such an assessment I have seen no cause to revisit it. Broadly the assessment appears to have been correct, as was my observation that the main driver of official opinion in these newer member states was security of supply.

The two main changes to affect official EU member state attitudes since 2006 have been the financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant problems in March 2011. These events have been major drivers of a shift in attitudes across Europe. I venture that in the newest member states the biggest impact has come from the financial crisis, while in the EU-15 the clearest impacts have come from the Japanese nuclear crisis.

I suggest that a considered assessment of the ways in which the Fukushima incident has affected official attitudes to the EU-15 would be of great interest. Arguably it is still too soon to undertake such an assessment as some of the technical realities on the ground in Japan remain unknown and some of the political and regulatory dynamics in Europe remain fast moving. It is not the purpose of this post to provide such an assessment. Rather the recognition that such an assessment might be of interest prompted to me to seek to record the reasoning behind my original subjective assessments and to clarify contentious points and possible errors.

Despite my declaration that I do not seek here to review changes in EU-15 official attitudes, I suggest that in order to substantiate my claim that such a review would be interesting I offer the following preliminary personal observations.

Two countries (the UK and Finland) appear to have responded with a desire to hold their nerve and to avoid knee-jerk instinctive decision-making. In the UK a careful evidence-based assessment of the relevance of the Japanese experience is underway, but thus far UK government policy appears to maintain its momentum. New build plans in Finland (e.g. Olkiluoto-4) press ahead.

The most visible policy consequence was the German government’s decision following heavy electoral losses to the anti-nuclear Green Party in regional elections, to abandon plans to delay the previously negotiated shutdown plans discussed earlier. This despite retaining the nuclear levy which had been agreed with the power companies as a quid-pro-quo for that extension. This political decision by Germany has had significant knock-on consequences for energy markets and energy policy on the Continent.

Another visible outcome was the heavy referendum defeat experienced by the Italian government led by Silvio Berlusconi. The referendum had been planned as a means by which Italy’s nuclear policy could be reversed permitting a return to new build. In the weeks and months following the Fukushima accident the Italian government tried unsuccessfully to postpone the referendum from its 12 June 2011 date. The scale of the defeat (more than 94% of voters opposing a return to nuclear power) suggests that nuclear energy will be off the agenda in Italy for many years to come.

Finally I would like to mention the most surprising consequence – a softening of French policy towards nuclear power. In the days and weeks after Fukushima a remarkable political discourse emerged in France where previously there has been a high level of political consensus behind nuclear power. Occasionally Socialist Party politicians might have expressed some scepticism, but generally the Party endorsed the nation’s nuclear ambitions. For the centre-right UMP Party support for nuclear power has been rock-solid for decades. However, on Friday 8 July 2011 French Energy Minister and UMP member Eric Besson said in an interview on the radio station Europe 1 that France would include a nuclear phase-out scenario by 2050, or even by 2040 in a range of possible energy policy scenarios going forward. He was quick to stress that such a scenario did not represent his own preference, or that of the French Government, but nevertheless it would be considered among a range of options. His stated that his preference would be for nuclear power to settle at roughly 2/3rds of French electricity generation, slightly below current levels. As such, official positions may not have changed much, but the reality is that such an opening-up of official thinking is profound in a French context. While clearly the accident at the Fukushima-Daiichi plant must have had a role changing the French debate, it is also important to stress that for many years nuclear power in France has not been especially popular with the public. In the 2007 Eurobarometer report French public attitudes to the risks of nuclear power were in the middle of the distribution of EU member states. 56% of the French public reported that in their opinion the risks of nuclear energy outweighed the benefits, while only 33% took an opposing view. Fukushima will have done nothing to reduce French public concerns regarding nuclear energy risks and the recent softening of the framing of French energy policy appears to reflect such political realities.

The years 2009-2011 have been turbulent ones indeed for nuclear energy policy in the European Union. In several respects my previously recorded assessments of EU member state attitudes are now out of date. I venture that the changes are not as profound as recent newspaper headlines might have implied, but I acknowledge that real shifts have occurred. I see the potential for useful research into such matters, but, as I have no such research to report, I shall stop writing now.

William J. Nuttall, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

In the EU, NPPs have an average age of 26 years in 2010. They have essentially been built in the 1980s and 1990s, with 30 % over 30 years of operation. Only 3 NPPs have been built in the last decade.

To illustrate the potential share of nuclear by 2020, we build two scenarios based on the previsions of nuclear new-built before and after Fukushima and with respectively a 60 and 40 years lifetime for reactors. The 60 years lifetime for NPPs corresponds to the general trend in the EU before the Fukushima accident where most nuclear operators expected to receive the authorization to extend their reactor lifetime from 40 to 60 years. Conversely, it is expected that, following Fukushima, the lifetime of NPPs will tend to be limited to 40 years as a consequence of phasing out policies (e.g., in Germany) and of increasing costs due to stricter safety standards (i.e., for some aging NPPs the investments to comply with stricter standards would not be economical).

In addition, it can also be expected that nuclear new-built by 2020 will experience delays or cancellations because of the costs increase mentioned above and because of political oppositions. As a result, we expect the number of new NPPs by 2020 to be reduced from 19 to 14. As table 2 shows, nuclear new-built will essentially take place in Eastern Europe member states (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic States) as well as the UK, Finland and France. The UK is the only member state with a ‘short term’ ambitious program for nuclear new-built with potentially up to about 10 GW in new capacity by 2020. Conversely, Italy had some long term plans for new-built that have been put on hold in the aftermath of Fukushima and the recent referendum.

Regarding the future of the current nuclear fleet, the effects of the Fukushima accident are very roughly (see above) simulated as a decrease in lifetime by 20 years (40 years instead of 60 years). Note that the corresponding post-Fukushima scenario does not take explicitly into account the fact that Germany has decided to close 8 NPPs by 2020. However, the 40 years lifetime hypothesis results in a similar outcome: 7 of these 8 reactors would have reached 40 years of operation by 2020.

The pre- and post-Fukushima scenarios, along with the current role of nuclear in 2010, are presented in the following table:

As table 2 shows, the outlook for nuclear in the EU by 2020 differs by about 30 % in terms of electricity generation between the pre- and post Fukushima scenarios with a share of nuclear in final electricity consumption estimated to respectively 34.7 % and 24.8 % in 2020, as opposed to 28.5 % in 2010. A 40 years lifetime for NPPs will also imply the retirement of 31 NPPs by 2020.

It is worth noting that the nuclear capacity will remain relatively stable between 2010 and 2020 at around 125 GW because of new capacities. Hence, in the post-Fukushima scenario, nuclear new-built will only come to replace retiring NPPs, and the increase in electricity demand (+22 % from 2718 TWh in 2010 to 3528 TWh in 2020 according to the EU member states renewable energy actions plans ) will be entirely met by other energy sources. Conversely, according to our hypotheses, the pre-Fukushima scenario would have been characterized by an increase of nuclear both in terms of share of electricity consumption and capacity installed.

The post-Fukushima situation implies that the limited construction of nuclear new-built since 2000, and potentially in the coming decade, combined with the aging of NPPs and the finalization of Germany phasing-out by 2022, will lead to an increasingly decreasing share of nuclear after 2020. For instance, while a 40 over 60 years lifetime implies the retirement of 31 NPPS by 2020, this number would rise to 93 between 2020 and 2030. In that respect, it is important to note that France, with 58 NPPs and about 50 % of the EU nuclear capacity in 2010, will doubtlessly play a key role for the nuclear outlook in the EU. In particular, the options for France to whether or not extent the lifetime of the existing fleet from 40 years to 60 years and in the longer run to renew the nuclear fleet will play a pivotal role for the role of nuclear in the EU electricity mix.

How will the share of nuclear involve in the longer run by (i.e., 2050)? While building scenarios today based on current expectations for nuclear new-built by 2050 will clearly be too speculative, one can look at the current outlooks for the EU electricity mix by 2050 and infer what these outlooks would imply in terms of new NPPs constructions between 2020 and 2050. In particular, as table 3 shows, we compare three outlooks under various hypotheses:

As table 3 shows, current – pre-Fukushima – outlooks forecast that nuclear will at most keep a constant share between 2010 and 2050 and could be substituted by renewables with a high penetration of these energy sources. This nuclear capacity will have to come from NPPs built after 1990 (resp. 2010) with a lifetime of 60 (resp. 40) years. In addition, while the outlooks from Eurelectric and the IAE foresee that the share of nuclear electricity will remain constant in the EU between 2010 and 2050 with about 30 %, these outlooks imply that the nuclear capacity will increase to respectively 183 and 169 GWe in the Eurelectric and IEA outlook (as compared to 130 GWe in 2010). Conversely, while the ECF outlook foresees that the share of nuclear will be reduced to 20 % in 2050, it would imply that the nuclear capacity will remain relatively stable with 124 GWe.

In the post-Fukushima context, we expect for 2050 a similar 40 years reactor lifetime. We assume that part of the public acceptance for new built is obtained when government commits to close downs old reactors as a compensation. As a result, the number of NPPs in 2050 built up to 2020 will amount to 14 as all the current capacities will have retired and the long term outlooks for the EU electricity mix imply that nuclear new-built will take place between 2020 and 2050 in order to renew the current nuclear capacities. In particular, table 4 infers, based on simple hypotheses, the number of NPPs new-built between 2020 and 2050 necessary to comply with the three long term outlooks highlighted in table 3. As table 4 shows, these outlooks lead to contrasting results in terms of nuclear new-built between 2020 and 2050 and range between 100 NPPs (Eurelectric) and 63 (ECF with RES = 60 %). At the same time, the number of nuclear new-built needed by 2050 is reduced by the increase in NPPs generation capacity as our expectations for new-built are based on large 1600 MW reactors as opposed to an average generation capacity of 915 MW in 2010.

To conclude, the Fukushima nuclear accident is expected to lead to a reduction in the plans for nuclear new-built by 2020 and to increase the phasing-out in countries such as Germany. As a consequence, our two scenarios estimate that while the share of nuclear power would have increased up to 2020 before Fukushima, it would be reduced to about 24 % because of the direct political decisions that have followed the accident. In particular, the new-built for 2020 in the post-Fukushima context will only come to replace aging nuclear NPPs and the entire increase in electricity demand between 2010 and 2020 will be met by other energy sources.

In the longer run, it is yet too early to forecasts nuclear new-built by 2050 in the EU. Yet, outlooks for the EU electricity mix by 2050 are useful to illustrate that, even with increasingly penetrating renewable energy sources, nuclear power is still expected to play a significant role, in particular as far as climate change mitigation objectives are concerned. In addition, the increasing electricity demand in the EU implies that with a 20 % share of nuclear capacity in 2050 (as opposed to 28.5 % in 2010), the EU would require a constant nuclear capacity. As table 4 highlights this capacity will have to come from nuclear new-built because of the age structure of existing NPPs in Europe with increasing retirements after 2020.

Michel Berthélémy and François Lévêque, Mines ParisTech

Although not entirely comparable, the current Japanese crisis is a reminder of the Chernobyl accident, the worse catastrophe in the history of civil nuclear power (INES level 7). The environmental and human consequences of the explosion at the Soviet plant were terrible: irradiation of people, the release of a radioactive cloud which crossed Europe, the displacement of thousands of people and soil contamination for several decades. Twenty-five years later, no definitive solution has been found for the confinement of the reactor or the decontamination of the surrounding land, of which an exclusion zone extends across a perimeter of 30km. An international donors’ conference met in Kiev in April 2011 to work towards a lasting solution and to find the necessary funding, hitherto lacking – including € 800m for the reactor’s confinement structure alone. The nuclear industry defends itself by claiming that each past accident has raised awareness of the various major safety risks of nuclear energy, and that this has led to a renewal and strengthening of prevention procedures and a rethinking of power plants in accordance with the demonstrated risks.

A public debate could well take place within a strictly national context. Some of the numerous arguments for and against nuclear energy are summarised below.

The need for a complementary debate at European level

Nuclear energy in Europe inevitably has a transnational and even continental dimension. A major incident in a member state’s plant would inevitably have safety implications for neighbouring countries – especially when near to a border, as is the case for instance of the French Fessenheim plant, near the German and Swiss borders. Countries deciding to avoid nuclear power because of its risks would find themselves indirectly exposed by virtue of the sovereign choices made by a neighbouring state, and their safety would depend directly on the safety policy of that state. Moreover, the current integration of Europe’s energy markets and networks is making the option of ending a nuclear programme somewhat artificial, since it will remain possible to import energy from nuclear sources in other countries. This is the case between France, Germany and Austria.

For all these reasons, it would be artificial to limit this debate to national confines. On the contrary, it is both opportune and necessary that the discussion take place at European level. However, currently there exists no instrument which would allow for such a debate. One possibility would be for member states to organise separate national debates which would take place in the same conditions and at the same time – as is already the case for the stress tests. An intermediate solution would be regional: neighbouring states belonging to a shared region could organise collective debates (for example France, Germany and Benelux; the Nordic and Baltic countries; the Iberian region; the Višegrad countries; or South-Eastern Europe).

One final option for encouraging a European public debate could be the “European citizens’ initiative” established by the Lisbon Treaty. In concrete terms, a petition containing at least one million signatures coming from a significant number of countries would oblige the Commission to examine this specific issue and the possibility of presenting proposals within the EU’s areas of competence.

Sami Andoura, Senior Research Fellow at Notre Europe, Pierre Coëffé and Maria Dobrostamat interns at Notre Europe

P.S. This contribution is an excerpt from a Notre Europe policy brief “Nuclear Energy in Europe: What Future?”

12 nuclear power reactors have experienced fuel-damage or partial core-melt accidents: The Sodium Reactor Experiment (SRE), Stationary Low-Power Reactor No. 1 (SL-1), Enrico Fermi Reactor-1, Chapelcross-2, St. Laurent A-1 and A-2, Three Mile Island-2, Chernobyl-4, Greifswald-5 and Fukushima Daiichi-1, -2 and -3. (see Table 1 in paper). Eleven of these (all except SL-1) produced electricity and were connected to the grid during some period of their operation, and all are now permanently shut down. In assessing the historical core melt frequency among nuclear power reactors, the number counted depends on how the issue is framed. SL-1 is excluded because it was an experimental reactor, and the design was abandoned after the accident. Although it was the first U.S. reactor to supply electricity to the grid, the SRE could be excluded because it was primarily a research reactor. Chapelcross-2 and St. Laurent A1 and A2 were dual use military reactors, producing plutonium for weapons and electricity for civilian use. From the data available to this author it is unclear whether any fuel actually melted in Greifswald-5. In five cases then, i.e., SRE, Chapelcross-2, St. Laurent A1 and A2, and Greifswald-5, the fuel melt or damage did not result in immediate closure of the plant; rather the damage was repaired and the reactor was restarted.

Worldwide, there have been 137 nuclear power plants that have been shut down after becoming operational with a total generating capacity of about 40,000 MWe and 2,835 reactor-years of cumulative operation (1). Thus, one in twelve [137/11 = 12.5] or fourteen [excluding SRE: 136/10 = 13.6] shut down power reactors experienced some form of fuel damage during their operation. Of the power reactors that have been shut down one in 23 [137/6 = 22.8] were shut down as a direct consequence of partial core melt accidents; one for every 500 reactor-years [2,835/6 = 472.5] of operation. Only about seven of eight giga-watts (GW) [40,000-5,250.5)/40,000 = 0.87≈ 7/8] of nuclear power plant capacity have been closed without experiences a fuel damage accident. One out of 13 GW [40,000/3,011 = 13.3] of nuclear power plant capacity have been closed as a direct result of a fuel melting accident.

Worldwide, there have been 582 nuclear power reactors that have operated approximately 14,400 reactor-years (1). Thus, to date, the historical frequency of core-melt accidents is about one in 1,300 reactor-years [14,400/11 = 1,309], or excluding SRE, about one in 1,400 reactor-years.

Worldwide, there have been 115 Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) that have operated approximately 3,100 reactor-years. Thus, to date, the historical frequency of core-melt accidents in BWRs is about one in 1,000 reactor-years [3,100/3 = 1,033].

Worldwide, there have been 49 BWRs with Mark 1 containments (the type at Fukushima) and 12 with Mark 2 containments. Five with Mark 1 containment (Millstone Unit 1 and Fukushima Daiichi Units 1-4) have been permanently shut down. These 61 BWRs have operated for 1,900 reactor-years to date. Thus, to date, the historical frequency of core- melt accidents in BWRs with Mark 1 and 2 containments is about one in 630 reactor- years [1,900/3 = 633].

In July 1985, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) stated (2):

We believe that the Commission should state that a mean core melt frequency of not more than 10-4 per reactor year [one in 10,000 reactor- years] is an NRC objective for all but a few, small, existing nuclear power plants, and that, keeping in mind the considerable uncertainties, prudence and judgment will tend to take priority over benefit-cost analysis in working toward this goal.

On August 4, 1986, the NRC published a final policy statement on safety goals, which said (3):

Severe core damage accidents can lead to more serious accidents with the potential for life-threatening offsite release of radiation, for evacuation of members of the public, and for contamination of public property. Apart from their health and safety consequences, severe core damage accidents can erode public confidence in the safety of nuclear power and can lead to further instability and unpredictability for the industry. In order to avoid these adverse consequences, the Commission intends to continue to pursue a regulatory program that has as its objective providing reasonable assurance, while giving appropriate consideration to the uncertainties involved, that a severe core damage accident will not occur at a U.S. nuclear power plant.

The NRC cites core-melt frequency estimates from probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies in the ranges from 2 x 10-5 to 1 x 10-4 event/reactor-year,5 i.e., from 1 to 5 per 10,000 reactor-years; and for Peach Bottom Unit 2, a GE BWR with Mark 1 containment, 1.202 x 10-5,6 i.e., 1 in 10,000 reactor-years.

Clearly, the historical frequency of core melt accidents worldwide does not measure up to the safety objectives of the NRC. On the whole the operational reactors worldwide are not sufficiently safe. If nuclear power is to have a long-term future greater attention must be given to the safety of current operational reactors worldwide. Older obsolete designs should be phased out rather than having their licenses extended. We should also revisit whether the newer reactor designs currently under construction worldwide and those on the drawing board are safe enough.

Thomas B. Cochran, Natural Ressources Defense Council

P.S. This post is an excerpt of my Statement on the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and its Implications for U.S. Nuclear Power Reactors Joint Hearings of the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety and the Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate Washington, D.C (available here)

(1) This sum excludes the US reactors, SL-1, Ml-1, PM-1, PM-2A, PM-3A, SM-1, SM-1A and Sturgis. The German KNK-I and KNK-II reactors are treated a one reactor.
(2) ACRS letter from D. A. Ward to N. J. Palladino, Subject: ACRS comments on proposed NRC safety goal evaluation report (17 July 1985); cited in David Okrent, “The Safety Goals of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Science, 236, 296-300 (17 April 1987).
(3) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Register 51, 28044 (4 August 1986); cited in David Okrent, “The Safety Goals of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Science, 236, 296-300 (17 April 1987).

Taken as a whole, the safety record of nuclear energy has been relatively good (1). In addition, new plant designs, so-called generation III reactors, have enhanced safety features compared to the 1970s-era generation II designs like those at the Fukushima Daiichi facility in Japan. And even the Fukushima reactors did not completely melt down after a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and a relatively direct hit from a massive tsunami. The number of people killed or injured globally from the nuclear energy system is far smaller than the number killed or injured, for example, producing energy from coal or even hydropower. France generates about 75 percent of its electricity from nuclear power and has been running nuclear power plants for decades with no major incidents (2).

A satellite image taken after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan was damaged by a 9.0 earthquake and tsunami in March 2011. The image shows severe damage to three of the four cube-shaped nuclear reactor containment buildings. Cracks in the reactors themselves were also later discovered at the plant.

On the other hand, the Fukushima Daiichi plant disaster demonstrates that even with all the precautions taken and multiple redundancies to guard against disaster, major unforeseen problems can occur and can have huge, long-term economic and ecological consequences. For example, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is now encased in a huge sarcophagus that will have to be maintained for hundreds of years to prevent radiation leakage, and a 2,800-square-kilometer area around the plant will be completely off-limits for a similar amount of time (3). The economic and social hurdles of locating and constructing new power plants have encouraged the relicensing of existing nuclear plants beyond their design lifetimes, increasing vulnerability and risk. Also, as more nuclear reactors come online—60 are currently being constructed in 15 countries—and those that were built before the 1990s begin to show their age, the chances for another disaster grow.

In addition, the long-term waste disposal problem has yet to be solved for nuclear power, and decommissioning costs are still highly uncertain. In the United States, after decades of trying, a long-term waste storage plan still does not exist. The proposed storage facility at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, was recently rejected by President Obama, partly on the grounds that it could only guarantee that radioactive material wouldn’t leak after 10,000 years of storage, while the minimum safety requirement established by the US Environmental Protection Agency is 1 million years. President Obama has set up a commission to examine these issues—revealing the stark reality that no one has yet found a safe way to store radioactive waste for the very long time period required. Even if the Yucca Mountain facility is approved, the current proposal would not have the capacity to handle the country’s existing radioactive waste, let alone what a new generation of power plants will produce.

Government subsidies have made nuclear energy appear to be a relatively cheap option. Legacy subsidies lowered capital and operating costs through the 1980s. Ongoing subsidies offset the costs of uranium, insurance and liability, plant security, cooling water, waste disposal, and plant decommissioning.

A suite of new subsidies in the last decade has extended government support to new reactors and upstream fuel cycle facilities. The effect of these new subsidies is simple: they externalize the cost of building nuclear reactors, thus distorting the price of electricity generated by nuclear energy. For example, the US government requires that a nuclear facility be insured only up to $12.6 billion. Although this seems like a large amount, consider that damage from the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill was estimated at $34 billion to $670 billion (4) and the US government called for an initial $20 billion fund for restoration. The cleanup costs from the Fukushima disaster could far exceed these numbers. Large government subsidies for nuclear energy lead to suboptimal decisions by consumers, investors, and society in general.

Faced with these grave issues, it is time to change our approach to evaluating nuclear power. It is time to make sure the full costs and benefits are clear and that enough information is available for society to make informed decisions. To do this we propose a few straightforward steps:

1. Eliminate subsidies for nuclear power, especially those that shift long-term risk. Government subsidies directly reduce the private cost of capital for new nuclear reactors and shift the long-term, often multigenerational risks of the nuclear fuel cycle away from investors to the general public (5).

2. Require nuclear power plant owners to buy full-coverage insurance against accidents. This can be accomplished by repealing the Price-Anderson Act, which limits liability for nuclear accidents to $12.6 billion, and similar subsidies in the United States and also eliminating limits on liability in other countries. Insurance companies are in the business of assessing and monetizing risks. Since new power plant designs are, according to their supporters, inherently safer, the insurance premiums should be lower. If the insurance companies are unwilling or unable to insure these nuclear power plants, plant operators should be required to maintain an assurance bond (i.e., self-insurance) adequate to cover a worst-case-scenario accident or to create new models of nuclear industry risk sharing (4). This would ensure that, if an accident did occur, costs would not be borne by the public but by the plant owners. It would also make the cost of that risk apparent in the short term and thus part of the price of electricity from nuclear plants.

3. Require plant owners to also maintain an assurance bond adequate to cover decommissioning and waste disposal costs. This approach is often used for mining operations to ensure that the mines are properly reclaimed. In most countries there are already some funds set aside for nuclear plant decommissioning and waste disposal, but it is almost certainly not enough to cover the real costs. The size of the bond would reflect the worst-case scenario for decommissioning and waste disposal and could be lowered (or raised) as more information is accumulated about the real costs involved.

Taking these steps would internalize many of the costs associated with nuclear power and would create a system in which the price of electricity from nuclear plants more accurately reflects the full costs and benefits of the technology to society. How much this would raise the price of electricity from nuclear plants would depend on the design of the plant, its location, how it is operated, how old it is, and other factors. This would give society a better (and more discriminating) picture of the true costs of nuclear power and would make comparing nuclear energy with other energy sources more direct and rational.

We should do the same for other sources of energy as well, many of which also receive huge subsidies. For example, what consumers pay for electricity produced from fossil fuel sources does not reflect environmental and health externalities. A recent study by Paul Epstein of the Harvard Medical School and his colleagues estimated that if the health and environmental externalities from coal’s life cycle were included in its price, the US public would pay an additional $0.3 to $0.5 trillion per year, which is triple the current price of electricity per kilowatt-hour from coal (6). This would make wind, solar, and other renewable sources of energy, which have much smaller subsidies and external costs, economically more competitive.

How would nuclear power fare if the subsidies were removed and the full costs internalized? It is hard to predict, but the answer to whether nuclear power can be part of the energy solution lies in how the full costs of nuclear compare with the full costs of fossil fuel, hydro, and renewable energy. For example, most people believe that nuclear energy is either completely free of greenhouse gases or contributes negligible amounts. However, this is not true when one considers the entire life cycle of the nuclear power complex. A 2008 study showed that if the price of nuclear energy included the cost of greenhouse gases, nuclear power would cost more than not only fossil fuel technologies but also wind energy (7). Including the cost of the risk of accidents and waste disposal, as discussed above, would raise the price significantly further.

So let’s remove the subsidies, require nuclear power plants to be fully insured, and put aside adequate funds for decommissioning and long-term radioactive waste disposal. Let’s do the same for all energy sources. Then we can use the market mechanism to find out whether nuclear power plants should be part of the energy solution.

Robert Costanza, Cutler Cleveland, Bruce Cooperstein and Ida Kubiszewski

P.S. This post was issued in Solutions Journal.

References

(1) World Nuclear Association, Hore-Lacy, I & Cleveland, CJ in Encyclopedia of Earth (Cleveland, CJ, ed), Safety of nuclear power reactors (Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for Science and the Environment, Washington, DC, 2009) [online]. www.eoearth.org/article/Safety_of_nuclear_power_reactors.
(2) World Nuclear Association. World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements [online] (March 2, 2011). www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html.
(3) Kubiszewski, I, Cleveland, CJ, & Saundry, S in Encyclopedia of Earth (Cleveland, CJ, ed), Chernobyl, Ukraine (Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for Science and the Environment, Washington, DC, 2009) [online]. www.eoearth.org/article/Chernobyl,_Ukraine.
(4) Costanza, R et al. The perfect spill: Solutions for averting the next Deepwater Horizon. Solutions [online] 1(5), 17–20. www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/629.
(5) Koplow, D. Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable without Subsidies (Earth Track, Cambridge, MA, 2011).
(6) Epstein, PR et al. in Ecological Economics Reviews (Costanza, R, Limburg, K & Kubiszewski, I, eds), Full cost accounting for the life cycle of coal, 73–98. Special issue Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1219 (February 2011).
(7) Lenzen, M. Life cycle energy and greenhouse gas emissions of nuclear energy: A review. Energy Conversion and Management 49(8), 2178–2199 (2008).

Let’s look at the figures: According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the average annual electricity consumption in 2009 for a U.S. residential utility customer was slightly less than 11,000 kilowatt hours (kWh). The average consumer price per kWh was just above 11 cents. Assuming a median annual household income of roughly $50,000 in the same year, the typical American household allocates approximately 2.5 percent of their annual income to all residential electricity demands. But as Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Richard Lester[1] has noted, “from the customer’s perspective, a nuclear kilowatt hour is indistinguishable from a solar or a coal kilowatt hour.”

Therein lies one of the fundamental problems. Since the inception of power generation and distribution, the use of various fuel sources has resulted in substantial environmental, political, national security, and public health consequences that are not internalized in that 11 cents per kWh figure. Hidden in the cost at the meter are the human health impacts and the irreversible environmental degradation[2] that come from the use of fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas. According to a 2010 United States National Research Council (NRC) report, the hidden health and environmental costs of coal‐generated electricity totaled a staggering $62 billion in 2005. “Life‐cycle CO2 emissions from nuclear, wind, biomass and solar power appear to be negligible when compared with fossil fuels,” the report says. It goes on to say that the fuel cycle of nuclear power “does pose some risks,” mostly from the health impacts from uranium mining activities.

But what about the costs associated with severe nuclear accidents such as what is currently unfolding in Japan? While it is way too early to assess the cost of the Fukushima accident, one can start with the costs associated with the repair and cleanup of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl as lower and upper bounds. However due to the rarity of these types of events and the long lives of these plants, it is the expected cost per reactor year that matters when comparing with alternative electricity generation options. Due to the complexity of assessing these infrequent but real externalities, the NRC committee did not attempt to explicitly monetize these costs but rather relied on external studies. According to one of these studies by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Resources for the Future (RFF), the total expected cost per reactor year for limited containment failure, massive containment failure, and transportation accidents were slightly higher than $1 million per reactor year[3]. The United States currently has 104 operating nuclear plants therefore putting the externalities of severe nuclear accidents at approximately $110 million per year (2005 USD). According to the ORNL report, this cost of severe nuclear accidents make up approximately 20% of the aggregate costs of nuclear operations.

In the wake of Japan’s nuclear crisis, it is time for this country to be honest and confront the true cost of generating electricity. Indeed, as we reflect upon the ongoing situation in Japan, and attempt to answer the many questions about the future of nuclear energy, here’s to hoping that the post‐ Fukushima societal calculus involves a much better understanding of the hidden costs associated with delivering cheap and reliable electricity. If it does, nuclear energy will likely continue to be a vital component of the global energy generation portfolio. If it does not, we will all be reminded that merely hoping for a careful consideration of the costs and benefits is not enough, and there is a reason why hope was all that remained in Pandora’s jar.

Edward Blandford is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

[1] This quote came from a speech for the 2003 conference titled “Atoms for Peace: A Future After Fifty Years?” organized by the Woodrow Wilson Center and Los Alamos National Laboratory.
[2] Renewable options such as wind and solar as well as energy efficiency campaigns are trying to help mitigate these risks but displacement of fossil fuels for electricity production requires proven baseload and dispatchable electricity generation.
[3] The ORNL and RFF report looked at two generic sites in the Southeastern and Southwestern United States. The costs associated with severe nuclear accidents are a strong function of the reactor type and surrounding area. Interestingly enough, on average the expected costs from transportation accidents are comparable with severe reactor accidents.

While the scale and the consequences of the Fukushima nuclear accident are still partly unknown, this accident will undoubtedly have short and long term consequences on nuclear safety requirements and public attitude toward nuclear energy. In particular, it is argued in Europe by both the European Commission and Member States that nuclear safety regulation should be reviewed in light of this nuclear accident and all the NPPs in operation are expected to be audited by nuclear safety authorities in the coming months based on a common set of criteria.

This debate should not be avoided as most certainly many lessons will have to be learnt from the Fukuyama accident on the various aspects of nuclear safety. In the past, accidents like Three Miles Island have played key roles in improving the safety of nuclear power plants in terms of design, operation, maintenance and management procedures.

However, while this debate on nuclear safety is necessary, we observe that policy makers are eager to take quick decisions about closing some NPPs because of their age. In particular, Germany has taken the decision to temporarily close seven NPPs based on the simple criteria that one should first close the oldest nuclear power plants. In France, political parties call for the shutting down of Fessenheim, the oldest reactors of the EDF’s fleet.

The following figure shows that nearly 30 % of commercial NPPs in Europe have more than 30 years of operation and that 60 % have between 20 and 30 years of operation. As a result, a decision criteria only based on the age of NPPs could potentially lead to the closure of a high and growing number of NPPs in the coming years.

At first glance, targeting the older reactors seems sound: intuitively, the older a reactor is, the more its components are degraded or corroded, and thus the more vulnerable they are; moreover, older reactors have been licensed in times where safety requirements were lower and their designs are likely to be less safe.

However, other factors may counterbalance these a priori negative effects of the age of NPPs on their safety level. Firstly, national safety authorities review with more scrutiny older NPPs. More inspections are undertaken. For instance, NPPs have to be fully reviewed after 30 years. Secondly, there are no different safety requirements for old and new plants. Old NPPs need to comply with today safety rules regarding operation and maintenance. Thirdly and consequently, the older a plant is the more likely genuine components have been replaced with new components. For instance, a growing number of of steam generators, are replaced in aging NPPs.

In practice, considering these two conflicting series of effects, is there any evidence of a negative correlation between the age of a NPP and its safety performance? While nuclear safety encompasses a number of criteria ranging from earthquake and flooding zones, design, operation and management procedures, we use in the following graph the unplanned unavailability factor as a proxy of the safety performance of NPPs in Europe.

These data are gathered from the PRIS database managed by the AIEA and they cover the 143 commercial reactors in the European Union built between 1970 and 2009 and still in operation. The Unplanned Unavailability Factor (UUF) is defined by the IAEA as “the ratio of the unplanned unavailable energy generation over a given time period to the reference energy generation over the same period, expressed as a percentage […].Energy losses are considered to be unplanned if they are not scheduled at least four weeks in advance .” For instance, the UUF includes extension of planned outages as well as forced outages resulting from equipment failures, human factors or other conditions under the management of the plan operator. On the other hand, it does not include energy losses outside the plan operator management such as electricity grid failures or lack of demand of power.

Hence, the UUF can be used as a very rough proxy to measure nuclear safety performance between nuclear reactors and over time. While it encompasses outage extensions, the WNA reports that nearly 90 % of unplanned energy losses between 2004 and 2008 were directly caused by plan problems or failures. However, as with every index, the use of the UUF in relation with the age of NPPs has a number of biases and could be questionable. For instance, a reactor that is equipped with an automatic system to switch off could have a higher UUF than a reactor without this safety net.

What do we observe? As the above figure shows, it is clear that in the first years of operation, the UUF of nuclear reactors is reduced and reactors unplanned outages drop on average from 8.5 % in the first 5 years of operation to 6.9 % over the entire time period. This can be explained by the adjustment of the plants in their first years of operation. But over the lifetime of nuclear reactors, do we observe a hockey cross or a U curve? We observe on average a tendency to higher UUFs when a reactor reaches it 30s and on average the UUF reaches its maximum in the 31 years of operation with a UUF of about 12 %. As NPPs need an authorization to extend their life time after 30 years, this peak in unplanned outages could be partly explained by the unplanned extension of planned outages for the replacement of large aging components, such as steam generators, which would in fact increase the safety level of nuclear reactors. This could further explain why the UUF is then reduced in our sample after the 30 years anniversary of nuclear reactors.

However, because the number of reactors built in the 1970s is low, our 95 % confidence interval (dashed lines) does not allow us to draw clear-cut conclusions on whether aging reactors would have lower safety performances. Indeed, we only know that the true value of our parameter (i.e., the UUF) is very likely (95% of likelihood) between 2% and 13% for the end of the time period.

In that respect, it can be argued that a decision criterion for closing NPPs only based on the age of the reactor is not supported by clear-cut evidence from NPPs operating track record. While it is important to review safety standards in light of the Fukushima accident, policy makers in Europe and around the world should not decide to close nuclear power plants merely because they are old. Reviewing NPPs safety standards will require more elaborated and multi-dimensional criteria, for instance the occurrence of 0 and 1 events on the INES scale as well the adequacy of NPPs to withstand earthquake and flooding risks. In particular, there are no reasons for aging nuclear reactors to be correlated with earthquake and flooding risks.

In conclusion, it is important to maintain to some extent a stable political framework with clear and objective decision criteria for nuclear safety standards. This is all the more true at a time where European utilities will need to undertake important investments to improve the safety level of the European nuclear fleet.

Michel Berthélémy and François Lévêque, Mines ParisTech